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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
DAVID CALDERON, : District Court Case No. 071901957 
071902173 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellate Court No. 20080743-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated August 4, 2008. 
Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4- 103(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA? 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for 
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 032), and 
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 60/2-11). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State 
v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). The Court applies "the clearly 
erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction 
with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). 
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied 
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvemtto, 983 P.2d 
556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
1996)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 
§77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. 
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(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified 
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
78A-4-103, Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony; 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. These 
findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In case number 071902173, the Defendant was charged with Arson, a 
third degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony. In case number 
071901957, the Defendant was charged with Receiving a Stolen Vehicle, a 
second degree felony; Driving on a Suspended License, a class C misdemeanor 
and Failure to Yield, a class C misdemeanor. In case number 071902173, the 
Defendant pled guilty to both charges. In case number 071901957, the 
Defendant pled guilty to the second degree felony charge of Receiving a Stolen 
Vehicle, and the State dismissed the two class C misdemeanors. The State also 
agreed to not file additional charges against the Defendant. (R. 62/2-4). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 26, 2008, the Defendant entered into a plea agreement with 
the State. As part of the agreement, the Defendant pled guilty to Arson, a third 
degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony; and Receiving a Stolen Vehicle, 
a second degree felony. Two class C misdemeanor traffic offenses and a class 
B misdemeanor charge of theft were dismissed, and the State agreed to not file 
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four additional second degree felonies and one third degree felony. (R. 62/2-
4). Defendant entered Alford pleas where the Defendant did not admit guilt. 
Defendant's attorney filled out a Rule 11 plea affidavit that Defendant 
signed. This plea affidavit listed the elements of the crime, but did not give a 
factual basis for the plea. In the section where the factual basis is to be listed, 
Defendant's attorney wrote "same as above." (R. 64-70). 
The prosecutor gave the judge a factual basis. This oral factual basis 
was stated as follows: "[T]he defendant was in - possession of the 1997 
Honda Accord which had been reported stolen by Foster Auto. He was 
arrested for that charge and the automobile was impounded to All Hours 
Towing since the Defendant was arrested while he was driving it. 
Later that day or into the night the Defendant made bail, went over with 
the assistance of some other people, got into All Hours Towing impound yard, 
drove the car through a fence, took it out in a field and burned it." (R. 62/4). 
On the second case, the prosecutor gave the following factual basis. "[T]he 
defendant was stopped in an automobile that was stolen. He gave two or three 
different stories that - as to where he got the car and also gave the officers a 
registration to a different Honda than the one that he was driving - these were 
all Hondas—than the one that he was driving." (R. 62/4). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant entered pled guilty to multiple felony charges without 
admitting that he was guilty. He entered what is commonly referred to as 
Alford pleas. When a defendant enters an Alford plea, the trial court is required 
to take a factual statement that either shows that the Defendant is guilty or that 
he faces a substantial risk of conviction if he were to go to trial. This 
requirement is grounded in constitutional due process and is necessary to 
insure that the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. 
The factual basis in Defendant's case did not meet the Rule 11 or the 
Constitution's due process requirements. The prosecutor simply made 
conclusory remarks that did not contain all of the elements of the charges 
against the Defendant. Furthermore, the plea statement that was filled out by 
Defendant's attorney failed to list a factual basis for the pleas. Since there was 
an insufficient factual basis put into the record Defendant's plea was not 
knowing and voluntarily entered. Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 
PLEA. 
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Under Utah law, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." 
U.C.A. §77-13-6 (2008). Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
governs the taking of a guilty plea. Strict compliance with Rule 11 is not 
required; however, compliance with Rule 11 creates a presumption that the 
plea was knowing and voluntary. See, State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, % 22. 
There are times where a defendant enters a plea of guilty even though 
the defendant refuses to admit guilt. These pleas are Constitutionally accepted 
and are entered pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision of North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
When an Alford plea is entered, the trial court must find, on the record, 
that there is a sufficient factual basis to accept the guilty plea when the 
defendant does not admit guilt. "[T]he record must reveal either facts that 
would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would 
suggest a defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial." State v. 
Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Establishing a factual basis 
when a defendant enters an Alford plea is necessary to ensure that the plea is 
knowing and voluntary. "Furthermore, to make a knowing guilty plea, the 
defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the 
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relationship of the law to the facts." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987). 
The trial court must also find that a sufficient factual basis exists that 
causes the defendant to face a substantial risk of conviction at trial. "The plea-
taking proceedings are intended to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty 
knowingly and voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees 
him or her prior to a trial verdict." State v. Stilling, at 671. 
In the case at bar, the Defendant entered an Alford plea. See, (R. 62/5-
12). When a defendant enters an Alford plea a stronger factual basis is required 
to be placed on the record than when a regular guilty plea is entered. 
"Implementation of these requirements for accepting a guilty plea vary 
somewhat when the defendant enters an Alford plea, whereby he or she is 
sentenced without admitting guilt. In those cases the record must demonstrate 
that there is evidence of the defendant's actual guilt." State v. Stilling at 671. 
The heightened factual basis for an Alford plea "is grounded in constitutional 
due process. . . ." Id. at 673. 
In State v. Stilling, this Court examined a number of federal and state 
court decisions. This Court held that when an Alford plea is entered and the 
defendant doesn't admit to all of the elements of the charged crimes, "the 
record must be sufficient to satisfy the trial court and/or a reviewing court that 
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the State's case is strong enough to warrant acceptance of the plea when guilt is 
not admitted by the defendant." Id. at 674. 
This Court also stated that "[w]hile the record as a whole need not be 
conclusive or incontroverted on the question of guilt, 'there must be evidence 
from which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty-a 
factual basis for the plea.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Owen, 858 F.2d 1514, 
1517 (11th Cir. 1988). 
In the case at bar, there was insufficient evidence presented to the trial 
court that would establish that the Defendant was guilty of the crimes charged 
or that there was a substantial risk that he would be convicted if he went to 
trial. There was a plea affidavit that was filled out and put into the record as 
well as a plea colloquy that took place. Each of these will be examined 
separately. 
A, The plea affidavit was insufficient 
Appellate courts are able to look at the entire record when determining if 
there was a sufficient factual basis. 'The record we examine to determine the 
presence of a factual basis for Stilling's plea consists of the entire record before 
us on appeal, which includes all portions of the trial court record certified on 
appeal." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 674. 
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In the case at bar, the Defendant's attorney filled out a "Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel." (R. 64-70) 
This type of document is accepted and encouraged when a trial court takes a 
guilty plea. However, there are several requirements that must be met when a 
plea affidavit is used. "The affidavit should contain both a statement of the 
elements of the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish 
the elements of the crimes charged." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 
(Utah 1987). 
There was a statement in support of guilty plea that was prepared. (R. 
64-70) Defendant read and signed this document. However, this document was 
deficient in establishing a factual basis. The statement was a standard Rule 11 
form used by the Weber County Public Defender's Office. There is an element 
section that was filled out. There were no specific facts listed in the element 
section. Below the element section is a factual section. The document states 
"These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) 
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest):" Defendant's attorney wrote in this section "Same as Above." 
This statement did not list a factual basis anywhere in the document. 
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B. The oral factual basis was insufficient. 
Prior to the Defendant entering the pleas, the prosecutor gave the court a 
factual basis. He stated "the defendant was in - possession of the 1997 Honda 
Accord which had been reported stolen by Foster Auto. He was arrested for 
that charge and the automobile was impounded to All Hours Towing since the 
defendant was arrested while he was driving it. 
Later that day or into the night the Defendant made bail, went over with 
the assistance of some other people, got into All Hours Towing impound yard, 
drove the car through a fence, took it out in a field and burned it." (R. 62/4). 
This factual basis covered two of the charges the Defendant pled guilty 
to, theft and arson. The prosecutor made a conclusory statement that 
Defendant had committed these offenses. There were no facts presented "from 
which a court could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty. . ." Stilling, 
856 P.2d at 674. Although the prosecutor indicated that Defendant was found 
driving a vehicle that was reported to be stolen, there was no evidence 
presented concerning one of the crucial elements, the Defendant's mental state. 
Furthermore, there were no facts presented as to why the State believed that the 
Defendant with some "other people" took the car from All Hours towing and 
burned it. 
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On the second case, the prosecutor gave the following factual basis. 
"[tjhe defendant was stopped in an automobile that was stolen. He gave two or 
three different stories that - as to where he got the car and also gave the 
officers a registration to a different Honda than the one that he was driving -
these were all Hondas—than the one that he was driving." (R. 62/4). This was 
another conclusory statement that that covered most of the elements of the 
offense but failed to give any facts that would show the Defendant had a 
substantial risk of a conviction if he went to trial. 
In State v. Stilling, this Court stated that "[i]n the more usual Rule 11 
guilty plea situation, the factual basis requirement insures that a defendant 
understands the strength of the State's case and admits to each element of the 
charged crime." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d at 674. In Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 
860 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court applied a substantial compliance test 
to a factual basis that was placed on the record. The Court stated that u[i]n the 
entire record, nothing supports a finding that an adequate factual basis existed 
at the time Willett entered his plea. The State has not adverted to any facts 
regarding the events themselves that could form the basis of a conviction. The 
closest anything in the record comes to establishing a factual basis is a brief 
colloquy. . ." Id. at 861. 
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The colloquy was given in the co-defendant's case. In that case, the 
defendant's son and co-defendant stated that he aided and abetted his father in 
the commission of killing the victim. Id. at 861-62. The Supreme Court found 
that this statement was "merely a legal conclusion, parroting the statutory 
elements of the crime charged against him." Id. at 862. The Supreme Court 
found that this did not constitute a valid factual basis and reversed the district 
court's ruling that there was a sufficient factual basis. Id. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, there were only legal and factual 
conclusions that were put in the record. Rule 11 (e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states that a factual basis is sufficient "if it establishes that 
the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;" This Rule was 
clearly not complied with. For these reasons, the plea was not knowing, and 
the trial court should have allowed Defendant to withdraw it. 
It was apparent during the plea colloquy that Defendant was not 
admitting guilt. When he was asked how he pled to being in possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, he answered, "Alford?" (R. 
62/10). 
His attorney then responded, "It is guilty as proffered." (R. 62/10) 
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Defendant then said, "Oh. Guilty as proffered." (R. 62/10) 
When the Defendant entered his pleas to the next two charges, he also 
answered, "Guilty as proffered." (R. 62/10). The court then asked the 
Defendant if he understood what an Alford plea was. He answered, "It's that 
I'm pleading guilty so my other charges doesn't get charged against me." (R. 
62/11). 
The court asked the Defendant if he believed that it was in his best 
interests to accept the plea. He answered, "Yes, sir." (R. 62/11). 
The court also asked the Defendant if he felt like if he went to trial there 
was a good likelihood that he would be convicted. The Defendant's attorney 
answered for him. He said "They're just (unintelligible) you'd be convicted 
because of the circumstantial evidence of the case and the direct evidence so 
you're pleading guilty to avoid the other charges." (R. 62/11-12). Even though 
the Defendant was asked if he felt like there was a strong possibility that he 
would be convicted he was not given the opportunity to answer the question. 
When the record as a whole is examined in its entirety, it is clear that the 
factual basis was insufficient to show that the State's case was strong enough 
to warrant acceptance of the plea where guilt was not admitted. In Henderson 
v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 9 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), the Supreme 
Court stated that "clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it 
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constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the 
defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the 
first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'" Id. at 645. 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 
274 (1969), the Supreme Court stated, "[w]hat is at stake for an accused facing 
[punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in 
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a foil 
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." Id. at 243-
44. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have stated that since "[t]he 
entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of several important constitutional 
rights" and "because the prosecution will generally be unable to show that it 
will suffer and significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted." 
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Utah 1987), See also, State v. Ruiz, 
2008 UT App 470 Tf 11. The Defendant's plea was not knowingly entered 
where he entered an Alford plea, and an adequate factual basis was not entered 
on the record. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as constitutional due process 
require a sufficient factual basis to ensure that a criminal defendant 
understands the nature of the charges and the weight of the evidence against 
him. In the case at bar, the factual basis was insufficient to show that there was 
substantial risk that Defendant would be convicted if he went to trial. For these 
reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
DATED this ^ d a y of May 2009. 
RANDALL W. RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
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£*aff f^ 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN.^r 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OELUiaHflEi \j ^ v w 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVID CALDERON, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071902173 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: July 30, 2008 
4U:. 
- ^ 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Prosecutor: MILES, BRANDEN B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GALLEGOS, RICHARD M 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 16, 1989 
Video 
Tape Number: 4C 073008 Tape Count: 2.40-2:47 
CHARGES 
1. ARSON - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/26/08 Guilty 
2. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/26/08 Guilty 
HEARING 
COUNT: 2:40 
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and 
represented by Attorney Richard Gallegos. Attorney Brandon Miles 
is present representing the State of Utah. Counsel address the 
Court, and sentencing proceeds. 
Sentence Judam^nt , n ^ n 
Page 1 
™*W* CALDERON.DAVID 
pages 4 
Case No: 071902173 
Date: Jul 30, 2008 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ARSON a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years m the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ARSON a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The defendant is authorized work release but is denied good time 
credit. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence m this case shall run concurrently with the sentence 
imposed m case number 071901957. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
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PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its 
terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse 
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary by Adult Probation & 
Parole, paying all costs. 
The defendant shall not consume any alcohol or illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment. 
The defendant shall obtain a GED or high school diploma. 
The defendant shall have no association with any known gang member 
or be involved m any gang activity. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a theft counseling 
program under the direction of Adult Probation & Parole, paying all 
costs. 
The defendant shall successfully complete tne Thinking for a Cnange 
program through Adult Probation & Parole or some other type of 
cognitive restructuring program, paying all costs 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation Sc Parole, and pay all costs. 
The defendant shall abide by a 7.00 p.m. curfew for the first 90 
days after release from jail, which may be modified by Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall submit to warrantless search, seizure and 
chemical testing. 
The defendant shall not wear gang attire or possess gang 
paraphernalia. 
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Dated this "( day of —/ CJL n 2 0 0 ,) . f 
ERNIE W JONES \ 
District Court Judge 
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< ^ / ^ , hereby acknowledge and certify that 
have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights, 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes 
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I have feceiv/ed a copy of the (Amended) Inrotmatiot asainst mc I nave read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the natuie and the elements of the cnme(s; to which I am pleadins 
guilty Coi no contest) 
The elements of th^ cnme(s) to which I am pleading g! iilty Cor no contest) ate 
^ L J L _ . J - g X ^ C J ^ _ _ ^ Q - ^ X j c> j r fe_ ^ s d CJLGJIXJ.* & $~Q6C , 
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I undersiana that b> pleadins suiity I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the (oiegoing 
cnmes) I stipulate and agiee (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest, tnat 
the following fa^ts descibe my conduct and the conduct oi other persons fo1 vvhicn i am 
criminally liable These facts piovide a basis ror the Couit to accept my guilty (or no contest; 
pleas and piove the elements o( the cnme(s) to which I am pleading guilty (01 no contest) 
M r~~) f\ Yt^^z—ns-TrveV / ., I,. '/ 
WAIv/EP Of CONSTITUTIONAl RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily I understand that I have tne following rights under ihe 
constitutions of Utah and the United States I also undet stand that if I plead guilty Cor no contest) 
I will give up all the following rights 
<6r^ 
COUNSEL I knov\ thai' have the ngh+ to be »epiesented by an attorney ano that if i cannot 
afioicl one an attome> wii! be appointed by the Courc at no cost to me I understand that I 
might later, if the Judge determined tnat I was aolc, be required to pay foi the appointed 
lawyer's service to me 
ha/e not waived my iight to_cojnsel) If 1 have waived my fight to counsel, I have done 
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the follo/ving icason 
If! have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have lead this statement and that I 
understand the natute and elements of the chaiges and etimes 10 which I am pleading guilt) (or 
no contest) I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) ^ *) \ \, Z ^ 
If I have /7of waived my right to counsel, my attorne/ is j ^ l c J v^X. v L H 
My attorney and I have fully discussed th»s statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilt/ (or no contest) plea(s) 
JURYTRKL I know that I have a right to a speed\ and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) 
jury and that I will oe giving up that right by pleading guihy (or no contest) 
CONFROI NATION AI JD CROSS-EXAMINATION of WITNESSES I know that ir I were to have d jury 
tna!, (a) I would have the light to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
(b) by my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me 
RIGHT I O COMPEL WITNESSES I know that if I were to have a jury tnal, I could call witnesses if I 
choose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas reouinng the attendance and testimony of 
the witnesses If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay 
those costs 
RIGHT TO TESTIS N-r PpMiiGr AGMNST SELF-IN:PI/AINMION I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I woulo have the right to testif/ on m/ own behalf I also know that if I choose not to testify, 
no one could make me testif/ or make me give evder.ee agans4 m/self I also know tha* if i 
choose no- to testify, the jur> woulo be told tna> the/ coulo not hold m/ refusal to testif> against 
«'ie 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF I know that if I do not plead guilty (or no 
contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged cnme(s). If 
I choose to fight the charges against me, ! need only plead "not guilty" and my case will be set 
for a trial At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) 
beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning 
that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, ! 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES or ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) 10 a 
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandator/ penalty 
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that dre dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, 
the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run at the same 
time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead 
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no 
''6 7 
contest) pleafs; now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me If the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, ' know the law 
requites the cou^t to impose consecutive sentences unless the Courr finds and states on the 
recoid that consecutive sentences would be inappiopnate 
PLL> BARGAIN My guilty for no contest) plea(s) (is/are not; the result of a plea bargain 
oetween myself and the piosecutmg attorney All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea 
bargain, if any, die fully contained in this statement, including those explained below 
z£j> jJ-jfTZTr, 
&^_ r*^ ^awozn-g^ ^JU^J)^,,:Clr^ 
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TRIAL JUDCp? NOT BOUND I mow that any charge oi sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation oi suspended sentence, including a i eduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel oi the prosecuting attorney aie not 
binding on the Judge I also know that any opinions the/ express to me as to what the/ believe 
the Judge ma/ do are not binding on the Judge 
DEFENDANT'S CEPTIHCATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice No force, threats oi unlawful 
influence of an/ kind have been made to get me to plead guilt) (oi no contest) No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me 
I have read th's statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own I know that I am free to change or delete 
an/thing contained in this statement, but! do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements aie correct 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney , 
I am (_£>_ years of age I have attended school througj/the l(^^3\&de I can read 
and undo*stand the English Language If I do not understand i'^lish^H-iTiteipiete! has been 
provided to me I was not undei the influence of any drugs medication or intoxicants which 
would impaii my judgement when I decided to plead guilty I am no j presentl/ undei the 
influence of any drug, medications or intoxicants which impair m/judgement 
I believe m/self to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentallv capable of 
understandino tl iese proceedings and the conseouences of my plea I am free of any mental 
disease, aefea, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing oy 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) pleat's), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) prior to sentencing I will be allowed to withdraw my 
plea only if I ^ how good cause Once I am sentenced, I lose my right to withdraw my plea 
DAI to this J b day of IK^o^—czJ^— , 20 0 & 
DEFENDANT 
CERTIF£AfE-er-DEFENSr ATTORNEY ^ 
I certify that I am the attome/ for \^^6L0 C^CK (^L^JKX^L^ <?^ , the defendant 
above and that I know he/she has read the statement or that' have read it to him/her, I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and <s mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge ana belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the cnme(s) and the factual synopsis-of the 
™ ^ 
defendant s criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, alonqy^n the otfieT 
representations and declarations made by the defendant injleffor^enri^a^idavit/^re §£clirate 
and true 
- ^ ^ T O R N F v C0f< DEFENDANT 
BAR N o / / 
iR Q 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSEC JTINC A T T O R N 
^ ucertify that I am tne attorne/ fof the State of Utah in the case against {/r^\j ( 6^ 
I CxJ^oUL- f~c^ defendant I nave reviewed this statement of defendant and find that the 
factual basis or the defendant's cnminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and 
correct No improper inducements, threats, 01 coercion to encourage a plea has been offeied 
defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attacned Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on the record befoie the Court There is reasonable cause to 
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the offensefs) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) is/are entered and that 
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest 
PROSECUTING ATTORNE/ 
BAR NO QSO&. 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and tne certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly and 
voluntary made 
It is hereby ordered that the defendant s guilt/ for no contest) plea(s) to the enme(sj set 
forth in the Statement be accepted and entered 
Dated this ZL? day of ^ L t L , c- ciA^^ Z0&&> 
DisTRiertbuPT JUDGE 
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defendant was in -- in possession of tne 199^ Honda Accord 
wnich had been reported stolen by Foster Auto. He was 
arrested for chat charge and the automobile was impounded to 
All Hours Towing since the defendant was arrested while he 
was driving it. 
Later that day or into the night the defendant made 
bail, went over with the assistance of some other people, got 
into All Hours Towing impound yard, drove the car through a 
fence, took it out in a field and burned it. 
THE COURT: Ail right. 
MR. DAINES: In 1957, the defendant was stopped in 
an automobile that was stolen. He gave two or three 
different stories that -~ as to where he got the car and also 
gave the officers a registration to a different Honda than 
the one that he was driving -- these were all Hondas -- than 
the one tnat he was driving. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And Mr. Calderon, on 
the other case, case ending m 2173, Count 1 is arson and 
that's a third degree felony, that carries the potential of 
up to five years in prison and a $5,000 fine. And the 
allegation is that between August the 8th and August the 9th 
of 2007, you unlawfully and intentionally damaged the 
property of Fester Auto or All Hours Towing by means of fire 
or explosives and the damaged caused is or exceeds a thousand 
dollars but was less than 5,000. 
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